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Introduction 
It has been twenty-five years since Joseph Nye introduced the concept of ‘soft 
power’. The shift from thinking of international politics in terms of the security 
studies calculus of ‘bombs and bullets’ and institutional liberalism’s networks 
of economic cooperation was path-breaking. Soft power’s new attention to 
issues of culture, values and norms anticipated what came to be called the 
‘cultural turn’ in IR (see Lapid and Kratochwil 1997).  
Even so, discussions of the soft power of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), like those of American soft power, generally treat it as an 
empirical question: rather than counting bombs and bullets, analysts measure 
the expansion of China’s global media platforms, the growing number of 
Confucius Institutes, and the growth of other soft power ‘resources’. Scholars 
thus generally treat culture and power as measurable entities, with many in 
the PRC lamenting that China ‘punches below its weight’ in terms of the 
international influence expected of a great power.  
This essay, along other articles in this special issue on ‘Soft Power in 
Hard States’, questions the empiricist/positivist framing of the analysis of soft 
power. Rather, it locates ‘soft power discourse’ in a normative dynamic 
(Callahan and Barabantseva 2011). Instead of accepting that soft power is a 
material entity that can be measured, it argues that soft power, like identity 
and security more generally (Walker 1993; Campbell 1998), is a social 
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construction. Hence it shifts from an empiricist explanation that relies on a 
truthful representation of the facts, to a hermeneutic understanding that relies 
on persuasive interpretation (Shapiro 2013, pp. 29-30; Bryman 2012, pp. 26-
32): rather than calculate ‘how much’, it asks ‘what does soft power mean?’, 
and ‘does it mean something different in an authoritarian state?’  
Simply put, the essay argues that soft power works in a different way in 
China. While Nye sees soft power as a positive attractive force that is useful 
for a state’s foreign policy, Chinese discussion of soft power is interesting 
because it does the opposite: soft power is negative rather than positive, and 
is employed as a tool in domestic policy more than in foreign policy. 
 When thinking about China’s curious approach to soft power, two 
recent events in London come to mind. To celebrate the 90th birthday of Henry 
Kissinger in May 2014, the Rothschild Foundation sponsored the first annual 
‘Henry Kissinger Lecture’ at the Royal Academy of Art in London. The lecture 
was delivered by noted philosopher Tu Weiming on the topic ‘Cultivating a 
Culture of Peace and Understanding: A Vision for 21st Century China’. For 
many, this is a prime example of China’s growing soft power: a European 
foundation sponsoring a Chinese-American philosopher to promote Chinese 
values to an elite international audience in the United Kingdom. Even more 
interesting was how the otherwise arch-realist Kissinger responded to Tu’s 
lecture by rehearsing the idealist narrative of China’s ‘Confucian Pacifist’ 
strategic culture (see Kissinger 2011). Here, both speakers present China as 
a positive attractive force in world affairs.  
London witnessed another Chinese soft power event in January 2014 
when Ambassador Liu Xiaoming (2014) tried to build friendship with Britons 
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by denouncing Japan as ‘Voldemort’ in both the print and the electronic 
media. Many thought that such name-calling was strange for a diplomat, and 
were not impressed by China’s literal demonizing of Japan (Hayashi, K 2014; 
McCurry 2014; ‘Latest China-Japan Spat’ 2014). Yet Ambassador Liu’s high 
profile criticism of Japan in the UK was seen as very successful in Beijing; 
over the next month China’s ambassadors in the United States, Australia and 
other countries engaged in similar public diplomacy activities in those 
countries’ national media.  
What are we to do with these two examples? Is one soft power 
because it presents China as an attractive force on the world stage, and the 
other not because it involves denouncing another country? Or does the 
Voldemort strategy of demonizing other countries constitute a different form of 
soft power? This essay will use Chinese president Xi Jinping’s new ‘China 
Dream’ discourse to explore what could be called China’s ‘negative soft 
power’ strategy. Rather than simply describing how China’s positive 
achievements and aspirations are being exported to the world, the essay 
explores how China dream discourse’s anti-Japanese, anti-American and 
anti-Western themes seek to build the positive Chinese self through the 
negative exclusion of Otherness.  
While it is common now to dismiss Nye’s notion of soft power as a 
‘fuzzy concept’, this essay takes it seriously by showing how soft power is 
employed in different ways in different contexts, specifically here how it takes 
a curiously negative form in Chinese discussions of the PRC’s relation to the 
world. This is increasingly important as China’s soft power strategy goes 
global due to the PRC’s growing wealth and confidence, in the context of 
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economic and political crises in Europe and the US since 2008 (Callahan 
2013). 
 
Power: Hard/soft, positive/negative, foreign/domestic 
As mentioned above, Nye concentrates on the positive aspects of soft power 
as a foreign policy tool. He famously defines it as ‘the ability to get what you 
want through attraction rather than coercion or payments’ (Nye 2004, p. x). 
The Chinese case, however, suggests that we need a more complex view of 
soft power dynamics. Rather than limit our inquiry to ‘soft power’ as a 
‘positive’ tool for ‘foreign policy’, it is helpful to understand the contingent 
dynamics of hard/soft power, positive/negative strategies, and 
foreign/domestic politics. Nye himself is going in this direction with the new 
concept of ‘smart power’, a strategy that describes a successful ‘combination 
of the hard power of coercion and payment with the soft power of persuasion 
and attraction’ (Nye 2011:xiii). Here I will concentrate on the positive/negative 
and foreign/domestic relations that are less discussed in Nye’s work. 
 First we should note that Chinese soft power is not an under-
researched topic. Since the mid-2000s there has been a large number of 
articles and books published in China, and many in English as well. Chinese 
interest in ‘soft power’ can be traced back to 1993, when Wang Huning 
(1993), who went on to become China’s most important establishment 
intellectual, published an article commenting on Nye’s new concept. Soft 
power was then employed in the early 2000s to explain Beijing’s shift to 
cultural views of domestic and foreign policy, most notably when President Hu 
Jintao launched his goal of ‘building a harmonious society’ in 2004, and 
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‘building a harmonious world’ in 2005. Discussion in China really took off after 
Hu (2007) declared his goal to build China’s ‘soft power’ in his Report to the 
17th Party Congress in 2007. This led to hundreds of articles in open-source 
academic journals, as well as classified research projects at official think 
tanks, including the China Institute for Contemporary International Relations 
(CICIR), and the Strategic Studies Institute of the Central Party School (see 
Men 2013, pp. 37-65; CICIR 2008; Li Mingjiang 2009). Outside China, 
academic, journalistic and think-tank analyses of Chinese soft power also 
began appearing in the mid-2000s (Gill and Huang 2006; Kurlantzick 2007; 
Callahan and Barabantseva 2011; Barr 2011; McGiffert 2009; Cohen and 
Greenberg 2009; Shambaugh 2013, pp. 207-268).  
These sources suggest that Beijing generally frames soft power in Nye’s 
terms (2011, p. 84; Nye and Wang 2009, p. 19; also see Armitage and Nye 
2007): ‘The soft power of a country rests heavily on three basic resources: its 
culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it 
lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when others 
see them as legitimate and having moral authority).’ Chinese scholars also 
develop Nye’s ideas: for example, in a public version of his classified report to 
the Central Party School, Men Honghua (2013, pp. 43-44) defines China’s 
soft power in terms of culture (including traditional culture), ideology, the 
China model of development (i.e. the Beijing Consensus rather than the 
Washington Consensus), the international system, and international image.  
Certainly, as in other countries, in China soft power is a contested 
concept. There are vociferous debates, but they are generally about where to 
find China’s soft power resources, with arguments about what should be 
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stressed: culture (ancient and/or modern), politics (socialism with Chinese 
characteristics), or economic development (the China model) (Men 2013; 
Shambaugh, 2013, pp. 212-15). Even so, the consensus in the PRC is that 
the objective of soft power is to fight against those who see China as a threat, 
and cultivate those who see it as an opportunity. Among many analysts both 
inside and outside China, for example, the 2008 Olympics is taken as a key 
success for China’s soft power strategy because it presented the PRC to the 
world as a country that is physically strong, technologically advanced and 
deeply civilized.  
 Certainly, much of the discussion of China’s soft power highlights the 
positive attractive nature of Chinese culture, values and foreign policy. What 
is under-researched is the theoretical dynamics of positive/negative and 
domestic/foreign. Rather than take for granted that we understand what the 
‘Chinese values’ are that inform the PRC’s soft power, debates over the 
sources of soft power show how Chinese values are being actively produced 
in an international dialogical process. Hence soft power is about more than 
the export of pre-existing essential values—it also involves the production of 
values both at home and abroad. Like in America, China’s soft power actually 
takes shape through the romanticization of a particular national culture into 
‘universally desirable values’. Before it can spread values abroad, soft power 
policy first needs to produce and police values at home. Soft power thus is not 
an entity that can be empirically measured, so much as a domestic process of 
social construction that defines the symbolic borders of self and Other, and 
thus of identity and security (see Connolly 1991, pp. 36-63; Walker 1993; 
Campbell 1998; Callahan 2010). 
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Following this line of argument for the Japanese case, David Leheny 
(2006, p. 223) feels that the concept of soft power ‘has less value as a tool for 
evaluating Japan’s regional importance than it does as a heuristic device for 
grasping how Japanese policymakers now see their regional role.’ I would 
push this argument one step further to suggest that soft power discourse is a 
useful heuristic device for understanding how Chinese policymakers and 
public intellectuals are actively constructing a ‘China’ and a ‘world’ to promote 
their ideological projects. In other words, soft power is primarily an issue of 
domestic politics—determining China’s future direction—and only secondarily 
about international politics. While Chinese discussions of soft power certainly 
seek to build favour among foreign audiences, they are also concerned with 
the identity/security issue of safeguarding regime legitimacy at home (see 
Edney 2015).  
This domestic focus is part of what Chinese Foreign Affairs University 
Vice President Qin Yaqing calls the PRC’s ‘identity dilemma’. Rather than 
worrying about how the PRC fits into international institutions like the WTO or 
the United Nations, Qin (2006) argues that the main issue for the PRC’s 
engagement with the world is the identity politics of answering the question 
‘Who is China?’ This identity dilemma is part of a broad and ongoing debate in 
the PRC about the ‘moral vacuum’ that China faces after three decades of 
economic reform and opening up. In other words, intellectuals from across the 
political spectrum—liberals, socialists, traditionalists and militarists—all worry 
about the ‘values crisis’ presented by what they call China’s new ‘money-
worship’ society (see Liu 2010; Xu 2011; Pan 2009). The heart of Chinese 
foreign policy thus is not a security dilemma between great powers, but an 
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‘identity dilemma’ within China as people ask ‘Who is China?’, and ‘What kind 
of world does it want?’ (Qin 2006, p. 13).  
The domestic focus of soft power and foreign policy also leads us to the 
other contingent dynamic: positive/negative. Certainly, Chinese culture is 
presented as a positive ‘treasure box’ of soft power resources, and Chinese 
history as a positive example of peace and development that is still relevant 
today. China’s domestic policy of ‘harmonious society’ and its foreign policy of 
‘peacefully rising’ in a ‘harmonious world’ are all based on the idealized view 
of Chinese civilization as open to the world and tolerant of outsiders. ‘Peaceful 
rise’ refers not just to recent experience, but looks to China’s imperial history 
as the benevolent great power that presided over hundreds of years of peace 
in East Asia (see Kang 2007; Katzenstein 2012, Callahan 2012; Rozman 
2013). Chinese soft power discourse thus looks to traditional Chinese 
civilization as a resource for Chinese values in the twenty-first century, 
especially the values of peace and harmony. 
Yet alongside this positive view of a benevolent China that embraces the 
outside world, identity and security are linked in the negative process of 
drawing symbolic borders between self and Other. Rather than a set of stable 
‘essential values’, civilization here is better understood as a contingent 
discourse that takes shape in relation to its opposite: barbarism. As political 
theorist Walter Benjamin (1968, p. 256-7) argues, ‘There is no document of 
civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.’ In these 
contingent self/Other relations, whenever we declare something civilized, we 
are simultaneously declaring something else barbaric (Todorov 2010; 
Campbell 1998). While Chinese texts often talk about 5000 years of 
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civilization, it is necessary to recognize that in order to affirm ‘civilization’, they 
first need to create and then exclude ‘barbarians’.  
Certainly, the difference between civilization and barbarism seems 
obvious; but as historian Arthur Waldron (1990, p. 190) points out that 
answering the questions ‘Who is China?’ and ‘Where is China?’ has never 
been easy. Foreign policy elites in imperial China had their own identity 
dilemma, and thus constantly debated where to draw the border between 
inside and outside as they defined their ‘civilization’ with and against the 
‘barbarian’. Identity and security are linked here in a moral hierarchy to divide 
the Chinese self from the barbaric Other, with ‘China being internal, large, and 
high and barbarians being external, small and low’ (Yang 1968, p. 20).  
This is not just a debate about ancient history: the Civilization/barbarian 
distinction that informed Chinese domestic and foreign policy in imperial times 
is making a comeback today as a model for domestic politics and international 
affairs (see Ma Rong 2004; Leibold 2013; Tobin 2014). Domestic politics thus 
is tied to foreign relations through this distinction: a positive, civilized inside 
takes shape only when it is distinguished from a negative barbaric outside.  
China’s current identity/security dynamic operates in much the same way 
through ‘negative soft power’: the Chinese self is defined as ‘civilized’ through 
the deliberate creation and then exclusion of Others as ‘barbarians’. This 
process polices what counts as ‘Chinese’ in a way that simultaneously creates 
imagined Others: ‘America’, ‘Japan’, and ‘the West’.  
This is similar to the process whereby the Russia seeks to generate soft 
power through the promotion of anti-American conspiracy theories on the RT 
television network: the goal is less to promote Russia values, and more to 
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‘spoil the image of the United States’ (Yablokov 2015, p. 12). Chinese texts 
likewise often promote anti-American conspiracy theories: like in Russia, the 
pro-democratic ‘Colour Revolutions’ are reframed as secret conspiracies for 
the immoral intervention of ‘the West’ into the internal affairs of legitimate 
states. Beijing’s official media narrative for Hong Kong’s ‘Occupy Central’ 
demonstrations in 2014 asserts that they are not a grassroots democracy 
movement, but an ‘American’ plot to Westernize and divide China (Bradsher 
2014). According to Peking University academic Pan Wei (2010, p. 58), 
Chinese critics on the mainland who advocate deeper political reform really 
want to ‘demolish the Forbidden City in order to build the White House’ in 
China, so ‘foreign forces can control China’s military, politics, economy and 
society’. Democracy here is not an ideal or a practice, but a foreign 
conspiracy, a ‘booby trap’, which the West employs to enslave China.  
While Russia’s negative soft power strategy uses conspiracy theories as 
a populist tool to reallocate power between the US and the Russian 
governments (Yablokov 2015, p. 2), China’s negative soft power strategy is 
employed primarily as a tactic for the domestic problem of building regime 
legitimacy (see Edney 2012, 2015). Domestic/foreign policy thus is closely 
linked to civilization/barbarism and positive/negative expressions of power. In 
other words, to understand the positive soft power of China’s dreams, you 
need to understand the negative soft power of its nightmares. 
 
Soft Power and the China Dream 
The concepts of ‘soft power’ and the ‘China dream’ were linked by Chinese 
scholars even before the China dream became an official slogan in 2012 (Li 
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2011). Xi Jinping (2014) discussed them together most prominently when he 
declared that to ‘realize the China dream’, the PRC needs to ‘enhance [its] 
national cultural soft power.’ It should not be surprising that these two 
concepts are now commonly linked by scholars and officials in China (Zhang 
2014; Cai 2013a, 2013b; Men 2014; Wang Yiwei 2013b; Wang Yiwei 2014), 
simply because they are invoked as a response to the ‘values crisis’ that has 
worried China’s public intellectuals over the past few years.  
The China dream became a major issue on November 29, 2012 when 
Xi Jinping declared that his ‘China dream’ is for the ‘great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation’, which, as he later explained, means ‘achieving a rich and 
powerful country, the revitalization of the nation, and the people’s happiness’ 
(Xi 2013, pp. 3, 5). Like with Chinese descriptions of the PRC’s soft power, 
Xi’s China dream appeals to a combination of traditional China and socialist 
modernity: especially the China model of development and Confucian 
civilization. The role of political values in official China dream discourse is 
manifest in the current propaganda poster campaign that celebrates the China 
dream alongside traditional Chinese values and ‘core socialist values’ (see 
Fig. 1). 
Certainly, the China dream is a positive expression of the PRC’s goals 
in domestic and foreign policy: to make the Chinese nation wealthy and 
strong, while providing the Chinese people with the social and economic 
benefits of a ‘moderately prosperous society’. In 2012-13, many people in the 
PRC were talking about their individual dreams: the China dream of getting 
your ‘dream house’ was a popular topic, as was the ‘entrepreneurial dream’ 
and the ‘dream of the good life’ (Ren 2013, p. 1; ‘Zhongguo meng’ 2013).  
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Fig. 1: Propaganda posters, Beijing, September 2014 
© William A. Callahan 
 
The Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo) newspaper joined this 
values debate with its January 2013 New Year’s editorial, ‘The China Dream, 
The Dream of Constitutionalism’. It called for legal limits on the power of the 
party-state, and argued that the quest for human dignity needs to go beyond 
economic prosperity: ‘Our dream today cannot possibly end with material 
things; we seek a spiritual wholeness as well. It cannot possibly end with 
national strength alone; it must include self-respect for every person.’ The 
editorial concluded that ‘the real “China Dream” is a dream for freedom and 
constitutional government’ (see Dai 2013; ‘Nanfang zhoumo’ 2013; Bandurski 
2013). Unfortunately, the Southern Weekend editorial was censored, and then 
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rewritten by the provincial propaganda chief to endorse a national dream of 
strong state power. 
Indeed, when Xi (2013, pp. 3-4) introduced his China dream in 
November 2012, he stressed how the country and the nation have to come 
first: ‘History tells us, the destiny of each person is closely connected to the 
destiny of the country and of the nation. Only when the country does well, and 
the nation does well, can every person do well’ (also see Ren 2013, p. 1). He 
later told a group of elite youth that they did not just have a ‘personal relation 
to the China dream,’ but had a ‘personal duty to completely achieve the China 
dream’ (Xi 2013, p. 6). In other words, individual dreams are important, but 
only acceptable when they support the national dream.  
Actually, the negative strategy of this soft power project was quite clear 
from the very beginning. Xi Jinping first discussed the China dream at the end 
of a tour of the ‘Road to Rejuvenation’ exhibit at China’s National History 
Museum, where he declared that he had ‘learned deep historical lessons’. 
History here is not merely China’s five thousand years of glorious civilization, 
but also its 170 years of humiliation where ‘capitalist imperialist powers 
invaded and plundered China’, and imposed ‘humiliating unequal treaties’ 
after the first Opium War with Britain 1840 (Qiu Shi 2013). It is important that 
Xi launched the China dream as his signature slogan at the ‘Road to 
Rejuvenation’ exhibit because it is the institutional home of China’s victimized 
sense of national identity as national humiliation (Callahan 2010).  
Although the national humiliation historical narrative is presented as a 
‘fact’ in Chinese textbooks, it is better understood as the party-state’s 
response to the 1989 Tiananmen movement. A patriotic education policy was 
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formulated in the early 1990s to shift the focus of youthful attention away from 
domestic issues and towards foreign problems. National humiliation themes 
thus are utilized in patriotic education not so much to reeducate the youth (as 
in the past), as to redirect protest toward ‘the foreigner’ as the key enemy (Xi 
2013, p. 6; Ren 2013, p. 1).  
Ambassador Liu’s depiction of Japan as ‘Voldemort’ thus is hardly 
exceptional. China’s national humiliation/patriotic education campaign has 
made dehumanized images of Japanese as barbarians the stock-in-trade of 
the PRC’s mediascape. In 2012, for example, sixty percent of the films and 
television shows made at China’s premier Hengdian World Studios were 
about the Anti-Japanese War (1937-45), and around 700 million Japanese 
people were killed in all Chinese films that year (Johnson 2013, pp. 48, 54). 
(The total population of Japan in 2012 was 127 million.) This is not a 
coincidence or an unintended consequence of China’s censorship regime that 
makes more contemporary topics off-limits for filmmakers. Especially since Xi 
Jinping came to power, painting Japan as a barbaric militarist state has 
become a key soft power objective. As a military scholar explains, ‘All 
Confucius Institutes should shape world public opinion to revile Japanese 
militarism’ (Peng 2014, p. 34).  
The China dream thus is part of China’s identity dilemma. It provokes 
discussions of Chinese identity that range from a broad aspiration for 
individual and national success, to a narrower victimized form of illiberal and 
xenophobic nationalism. The optimism of the China dream here relies on the 
pessimism of the national humiliation nightmare. The China dream thus is not 
just a positive expression of national aspirations; at the same time, it is a 
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negative soft power strategy that cultivates an anti-Western and an anti-
Japanese form of Chinese identity.  
 
China dream/American dream 
Many discussions of the China dream in the PRC actually start with the 
American dream (Zhang 2014; Nanfang Zhoumo 2014; Zhou 2011; Liu 
Yazhou in Liu Mingfu 2010; Zhao 2006; Brady 2008, p. 5; Wang Yiwei 2013a; 
Shi 2013), which should not be surprising since the American dream is a 
global discourse. One scholar even stated that only great powers like China 
and the United States ‘dare to have national dreams’ (Shi 2013).  
But the China dream is usually discussed as a challenge to the 
American dream. For example, just before Xi Jinping went to the US to meet 
President Barak Obama in June 2013, the People’s Daily explained the 
‘Seven Major Differences between the China Dream and the American 
Dream’ in terms of China’s dream of national wealth and power, and 
Americans’ dreams of personal freedom and happiness (Shi 2013). China 
here is defined as a nation united in its virtuous pursuit of global power, while 
America is portrayed as a collection of individuals bent on their own selfish 
schemes.  
The morality of the China dream was brought home in a web-based 
forum called ‘Immoral and Untrustworthy Americans’ hosted by the People’s 
Daily in May 2013, again, just before Xi’s visit to the United States (‘“Wude 
wuxin Meiguoren”’ 2013). The forum invited Chinese readers to share their 
bad experiences in the United States as a way of reminding people that 
America has its own problems. Official commentators thus conclude that the 
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American dream as a whole is a ‘failure’ because not every single American 
has been able to achieve their individual dream (Xu 2013, p. 127).  
 Although he does not point directly at the American dream, Xi Jinping 
(2013, p. 27) told journalists from BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) that 
China ‘can’t follow other countries’ development models’. A scholar fleshed 
out this point in the Global Times: ‘We do not dream the dreams of other 
countries, especially not the American dream. The American model causes 
great harm,’ and thus is a bad example for China (Wang Yiwei 2013a).  
The goal here is first to convince people that values are ‘national’ 
(other than from some other form of community), and then to show them that 
Chinese values are not only different from American values, but are the 
opposite: Chinese values are good, while American values are evil (see Tian 
2013; Zhang 2014). Once again, the Chinese self is formed against an 
imagined Other as the civilization/barbarism distinction is employed to draw 
lines between inside and outside, China and the world.   
This is a matter of international politics because many commentators, 
including liberal intellectuals like journalist Hu Shuli (2013), argue that China 
and the United States are involved in a Cold War-style battle of the American 
dream versus the China dream. The military agrees: ‘Silent Contest’ (Jiaoliang 
wusheng 2013), a documentary film from China’s National Defense 
University, sees American values as the main existential threat to the PRC. 
China’s new National Security Council likewise sees ‘Western values’ as a 
major ‘unconventional threat’ faced by the PRC (Hayashi, N. 2014; Edney 
2015). Hence liberal journalist Hu Shuli (2013) follows the general trend to 
argue that once Beijing has clarified its China dream, then ‘Chinese diplomacy 
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will have found a new lease on life’, and will be able to us its soft power to 
beat America on the global stage.  
Wang Yiwei’s (2013b) Global Times article ‘Foreigners’ 10 Mistakes 
about the “China Dream”’ neatly summarizes the logic of negative soft power 
(also see Men 2013, p. 40). To present ‘China’ as a positive force, it has to 
blame ‘foreigners’ (and ideologies that it labels as ‘foreign’) for 
misunderstanding or maligning China’s rise. Foreigners’ ‘mistakes’ include 1) 
calling it the ‘China dream’ rather than the ‘Chinese dream’; 2) saying that the 
China dream will replace the American dream; 3) seeing the China dream as 
utopian rather than practical; 4) thinking that the China dream entails 
abandoning communist ideals; 5) thinking that the China dream means 
abandoning the pragmatic policy of reform and opening; 6) seeing the China 
dream as the constitutional dream, the dream of human rights, and the 
democracy dream; 7) seeing the China dream as a dream of modernization 
as Westernization; 8) thinking that the rejuvenation of China includes a 
resurrection of the imperial tributary system; 9) thinking that the China dream 
is the dream of China’s rise; and 10) seeing the Chinese dream as one of 
liberal nationalism that is actually narrow nationalism. 
While Wang blames ‘foreigners’ for ‘misunderstanding’ China, a closer 
look at these complaints shows that they actually reflect debates about the 
meaning of the China dream that are taking place within the PRC among 
Chinese citizens. China dream discourse here is a key site of the PRC’s 
identity dilemma, with a range of answers to the question ‘Who is China?’ 
As ‘mistake number one’ shows, even how to translate ‘Zhongguo meng’ 
has become a key political issue. It is common now for Chinese officials and 
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intellectuals to criticize non-Chinese who translate it as ‘The China dream’ 
because they are worried that it suggests that the dream is for China to be a 
strong militarist state. People like Wang say that ‘Chinese dream’ is the 
correct translation because, like the American dream, it suggests a grassroots 
dream of the people, rather than the top-down dream of the party-state. 
Actually before ‘Zhongguo meng’ became an official slogan, covers of various 
books showed that the standard English translation was in fact ‘The China 
Dream’ (Liu Mingfu 2010; Zhou 2011). In the first few months of the slogan’s 
life as an official policy, it was translated both as ‘The China Dream’ and the 
‘Chinese Dream’ in official and unofficial texts. The official English-language 
translation of ‘Zhongguo meng’, however, dramatically shifted from ‘The China 
Dream’ to the ‘Chinese Dream’ in March 2013 for the reasons noted above: it 
promotes a less threatening notion of Chinese aspirations (see ‘Chasing’ 
2013). Hence this example shows two important things about soft power 
discourse in China: 1) the party-state seeks to use its tried-and-true domestic 
propaganda strategy to control discourse in international space (see Edney 
2012); and 2) Chinese identity is constructed with and against the foreign 
Other.  
The other nine points are involved in similar discursive politics. Rather 
than being a description of ‘China’ correcting ‘foreign’ mistakes, they rehearse 
many of the debates among Chinese that we examined above: some Chinese 
call for individual dreams, while others concentrate on collective dreams; 
some demand a constitutional dream, while others say this is inappropriate for 
the PRC; and so on. The point of China dream policy thus is not only to tell 
people what they can dream, but more importantly, what they cannot dream: 
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the negative soft power strategy thus serves to exclude many individual 
dreams, the constitutional dream, the American dream, and so on. 
Wang’s article thus exemplifies the two main arguments of this essay: 1) 
rather than extolling China’s attractive strengths, soft power is often 
expressed in a negative way that equates ‘the foreign’ with ‘mistakes’ that are 
either stupid misunderstandings or evil conspiracies, both of which are 
accused of undermining China’s rightful rise; 2) this discussion is largely 
taking place in domestic space through Chinese-language materials involved 
in the ‘identity dilemma’ about who China should be—and who it should not 
be.  
Rather than being attractive and embracing difference, the China 
dream is part of a broad practice whereby identity is constituted by excluding 
difference. It is seen as a tool in a global soft power battle that will produce 
clear winners and losers in a life-or-death zero-sum struggle. As one of the 
first theorists of the China dream, Colonel Liu Mingfu (2010, p. 9), explained, 
‘If China in the twenty-first century cannot become world number one, cannot 
become the top power, then inevitably it will become a straggler that is cast 
aside.’ 
 
Conclusion  
This essay has argued that we need to have a more complex view of soft 
power. First it questioned the dominant view that soft power is an entity, a 
variable, which can be empirically measured. It argued that soft power is best 
understood as a social construction that can tell us about identity and security 
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dynamics, in particular the contingent relations of hard/soft power, 
positive/negative strategies, and foreign/domestic politics.  
While mainstream soft power theory looks to idealized notions of the 
self (e.g. ‘national image’) that are exported to benefit foreign relations, the 
essay used Chinese texts to develop the idea of ‘negative soft power’, where 
identity is constructed by excluding difference in an identity/security dynamic 
that primarily works in domestic space. Chinese civilization characteristically 
is seen as a major source of the PRC’s soft power; the essay argued that 
civilization is not an ‘entity’ but generally takes shape against the negative 
idealization of ‘barbarism’. Even very positive discourses like the China dream 
rely on mobilizing negative images of ‘the foreign’ as barbaric. 
 Although Chinese soft power discourse generally works in domestic 
space to generate national identity and regime legitimacy, China’s negative 
soft power strategy is increasingly going global due to a combination of 
factors: especially, China’s new wealth and confidence in the context of 
economic and political crises in Europe and the US since 2008.  
One of the most prominent aspects of China’s soft power policy is the 
spread of Confucius Institutes around the world since 2004. According it Vice-
Minister Xu Lin, the Director-General of the Confucius Institute Headquarters 
(CIH), Confucius Institutes are the ‘brightest brand of China’s soft power’ 
(‘2006: Kongzi xueyuan’ 2007). But as events at the European Association of 
Chinese Studies (EACS) biennial conference in 2014 showed, even China’s 
brightest brand employs negative soft power strategies. CIH was one of the 
co-sponsors of the conference, where Xu gave a keynote speech. According 
to a report by the EACS president, Xu was upset by some of the paper topics, 
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and dismayed by the prominent display in the conference materials of 
information about Taiwanese sponsors. Xu’s solution was to steal all of the 
programs and tear out pages that referred to CIH, Taiwan’s Chiang Ching-
Kuo Foundation and the Taiwan National Central Library. When EACS 
President Roger Greatrex discovered this censorship, he ordered that copies 
of the excised pages be distributed to all conference participants. The EACS 
report concluded by proclaiming that ‘Censorship of conference materials 
cannot and will never be tolerated by the EACS’ (Greatrex 2014a, 2014b).  
Such censorship was seen as a setback for China’s soft power in many 
journalistic commentaries (‘Beijing’s Propaganda’ 2014; Redden 2014; Cai 
2014). But back in Beijing, Vice Minister Xu was cheered on by the Global 
Times, which saw her page-tearing as a heroic patriotic action in the fight 
against Taiwanese independence (‘Hanban zhuren’ 2014). Once again, the 
main audience for soft power activities, even those of China’s brightest brand, 
is not outside China, but inside the PRC. It works through the negative 
strategy of censoring academic materials, rather than the positive strategy of 
spreading Chinese civilization. Trouble in Europe does not matter as much as 
success in Beijing. 
The China dream likewise informs soft power discourse that is very 
popular within the PRC (Ma Haiyan 2013; Liu Xiaoying 2013; Cai 2013b), but 
which gains little traction abroad. This makes sense as it promotes largely 
negative portrayals of foreign countries in order to mobilize China’s domestic 
audience (see Zhang 2014). In this way, the China dream’s negative soft 
power evokes a form of nationalism that is employed to safeguard the CCP’s 
regime legitimacy (see Edney 2015). China Dream discourse thus combines 
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the insights of Edney’s and Yablokov’s (2015) articles: soft power is 
generated through the negative dynamic of conspiracy theories in the service 
of building national ‘cohesion’ in domestic space. While the PRC is strong in 
economic and military terms, its regime security as ‘fragile superpower’ is 
more tenuous (Shirk 2008). Hence soft power in China takes on more 
negative forms that are directed at a domestic audience. 
Yet according to Nye’s version of soft power, foreign audiences are 
crucial; if soft power products are not attractive to them, then the soft power 
strategy is unsuccessful. Certainly, we could follow the current academic 
trend to celebrate how China has adopted and adapted the soft power 
concept to suit its needs. But if a goal is to turn enemies into friends, then it is 
not working very well. Here the PRC is a ‘partial power’ whose global 
influence is broad, but thin (Shambaugh 2013, p. 268).  
This is a major problem for soft power in hard states. 
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